A Philosophical Inquiry

Obama Meets Netanyahu

Why I Oppose the Two State Solution.

On March 3rd President Obama met with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss the on-going negotiations to create a Palestinian state. Obama emphatically advocated his belief that it is still possible to act. Netanyahu, decidedly ambiguous yet dangerous, also spoke of a twenty year peace process in which Israel had given much and received nothing but rockets and violence. The Prime Minister’s own grammar gave the game away. Bibi spoke only of what Israel had done, overtly avoiding the question of what Israel is doing. Settlement construction is accelerating across the West Bank and the mechanical infrastructure for apartheid is made permanent with each passing day.

From reports, an apparent sticking point is the Palestinian refusal to agree and commit to the idea that Israel is a Jewish state. What does this mean exactly? Does this mean that Israel is to be a government with two tiers of citizens? Will the government give an institutional priority to one of these groups and necessarily discriminating and abandoning the idea of equal treatment? There is a great tragic irony in this question for Israel today. The German National Socialists also created an institutionalized infrastructure for discriminating treatment. Of course, the Nazis ultimately found the bifurcation of German society as intolerable and enacted their final solution to the horror of humanity. If there is no solution imminent then Israel will ultimately cease to be a democracy itself. This, I believe, is intolerable for the majority of the Israeli public.

I oppose the two state solution because it is not a solution. The creation of an institutional bifurcation, a material division that bifurcates the free flow of individuals between ‘states’ only contributes to the problem. The two state solution addresses a symptom and not a cause. I believe that the only solution is that of justice and a commitment by the people of Israel to have a secular state, not a Jewish state. The mechanisms of government and state must be disentangled from religion and any perceived sense of race or culture. Peace requires justice and justice requires equal consideration. Israel must reform itself.

With great horror, I have read many reports of arab-Israeli citizens being treated differently in the court system. This is outrageous and signifies the demarcating point between the United States and Israel. In the end, I believe there ought to be one state, united in justice, where Palestinians have equal voice in governance.

Netanyahu bluntly offered the contradiction that peace requires strength, a code word for force. What Israel needs today is not a strong man willing to risk regional war at regular intervals, Israel needs a Gandhi or Mandela. What is needed more than ever is to tear down the walls between Israel and Palestine and pursue a path in which Palestine will become a province in a united Israel with equal representation.

Israel must shed its commitment to a racial form of thinking that divides the world up by ideology. I believe a United Israel will be the final result in the end – the question is how much time and how many lives must be lost? Israel ought to honor those crushed in the Holocaust by observing the fundamental lesson that justice demands. Whether you be Jewish, Palestinian, Iranian, Black, White, Muslim or Christian all persons deserve equal treatment before the law. Justice requires the de-racialization of Israel.

One of the things I have been noticing over the years, is that consistently more and more of my students argue that torture is a justifiable practice given specific situational criteria. Almost universally, these students take a consequentialist approach when evaluating this issue. What I find so striking is that I think the very issue of tortue has become normalized since the introduction of enhanced interrogation techniques by the Bush administration. Its hard to imagine many people arguing to defend torture prior to the events of September 11th and yet I find, to my surprise, that most people do today. But what does that mean? For instance, consider that if torture becomes normalized then what specific moral principle have we lost that we earlier had? Has there really been a large moral shift on this question since 9/11?

What do you think?

Take a look at a new report by NPR on how Lucretius’ philosophical poem survived a thousand years of forgetfulness. We owe a huge debt to the monasteries of the middle ages! Thank you!
Click here to listen to the report

This morning in the brisk fall air I sat alone at a bench here at the college reading Bernard Williams’ “Philosophy and the Understanding of Ignorance”. It is an excellent essay on the role of skepticism in philosophy. Williams contends, and correctly I think, that there are at least two types of skepticism available in philosophy. The first we might call the absolute or complete skeptic for whom philosophy is the renunciation of all truth. As Williams comically writes:

“Someone who is genuienly worried whether or not he or she knows that another person is in pain, even if that person is writhing n the floow with a knife in his leg, is someone who should be referred for clinical treatment”.

This sort of skepticism is actually rather dull and uninteresting for the reason that if you know you know nothing about everything, then that is tantamount to saying nothing about everything. The other type of skepticism, more interesting philosophically indeed, is that skepticism which doubts not that we can know anything, but rather doubts the character of what it is we think we know.

“It is only because we can accept large numbers of facts about the past, many of them in themselves very boring, that we can confront the genuinely disturbing suggestion that historical understanding requires narrative, and narrative demands closure, and closure in history is always a fiction and often a lie”

The question becomes increasingly poignant when we ask when it is we can know that we don’t know. For instance, I may not know the middle name of the College Chancellor, but I do know that I don’t know it – or even that he has a middle name. This seems to be a case in which ignorance counts as knowledge. There are other types of ignorance that I can’t even be sure that I don’t know though. For instance, consider a person walking back to their car after shopping for a couple of hours at a market place and cannot find their car. This person will likely say after some time – “I don’t know where I parked”. In this case it seems absurd to say that they do not know where their car is in the same manner in which I might not know someone’s middle name; but on the other hand, there is a similarity in the two cases. Typically, one will retort, the problem is not that you do not know but rather that you cannot remember – this suggestion hangs onto the coat tails of the idea that one cannot be ignorance can never be absolute or complete. For to know of ignorance is necessarily to know something.

If philosophy is to be conceived by some skeptical means, then we must continually remind ourselves that this sort of skepticism will never be complete, nor ought we to think this is so. I conclude with this quotation from Williams’ essay:

“Recent forms of skepticism, drawing in many cases on a very partial reading of Nietzsche, have tried to discredit the notion of truth altogether. In doing this they typically take on a tone of mild heroism about their project of uncovering our illusions… What is disquieting about such positions is not so much their self-refutation, as their false promise of discomfort. What casts suspicion on everything casts suspicion on nothing…”

Read more of Williams here:

In logic, the question of the relation between mathematics and logic is one of the most crucial questions. If we conceive of logic as the structure of correct reasoning whereby truth can be inferentially related through a formal series of premises that flow into a conclusion filling it with life, truth, and necessity, and we also see the same sort of occurrence in mathematical modes of calculation, then we might well ask whether or not logic a species of mathematics or vice versa? And while this question is hardly new, the impact of how we answer this question is hardly to be ignored. For if logic is a species of calculation then we might well say that the highest philosophy is nothing other than abstract mathematics, that Pythagoras is the true innovator and not Plato. On the other hand, if mathematics is a subset of logic, as it were, then we might well affirm with Plato that mathematics is simply the first step towards enlightenment and not the last. So the question of course boils down to the historical distinction between Thomas Hobbes who claimed the former and Frege who argued for the latter. Ironically it was Frege, who in saying that all arithmetic can be deduced from logical concepts who needed Cantor’s insight of the continuum hypothesis. As they say, one sits upon the shoulders of giants: and just as Plato sat atop Pythagors, so too Frege peers from atop the great work of a mathematician. So what does Frege say, but “It is only recently that infinite numbers have been introduced in a remarkable work by G. Cantor. I heartily share his contempt for the view that in principle only finite Numbers ought to be admitted as actual. Perceptible by the senses they are not, nor are they spatial – any more than fractions are, or negative numbers, or irrational or complex numbers; and if we restrict the actual to what acts on our senses or at least produces effects which may cause sense-perceptions as near or remote consequences, then naturally no number of this kind is actual… For us, because our concept of NUmber has from the outset covered infinite numbers as well, no extension of its meaning has been necessary at all.” (p. 443 The Development of Logic) There is certainly more to say here. But we can at least begin to see the ways in which Frege felt that Cantor was correct in his postulation of cardinality. Cantor’s set theory eventually set the groundwork for Frege to make the great innovation of his theory of number in which numbers can be defined in terms of cardinal sets. For an excellent video to introduce you to both Cantor and Frege please see:

Dangerous Knowledge

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AJ Ayer Interview

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As of late I have been reading “Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles” by Jacques Derrida which presents a fabulously interesting analysis of femininity in philosophy – and in particular, Nietzsche’s philosophy. Here are a few passages that are particularly provocative:

“Truth can only be a surface. But the blushing movement of that truth which is not suspended in quotation marks casts a modest veil over a surface. And only through such a veil which thus falls over it could truth become truth, profound, indecent, desireable. But should that veil be suspended, or even fall a bit differently, there would no longer be any truth…” (p59)

and also:

“And in truth, they too are men, those women feminists deirded by Nietzsche. Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man. And in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this women lays claim – just as much claim as he – to truth, sicence and objectivity in all their castrated delusions of virility. Feminism too seeks to castrate. It wants a castrated woman. Gone the style… Feminism’s lack of style is denounced by Nietzsche…” (p 65)

These passages are quite interesting. But it should be made clear hear that the vital importance of feminity isn’t being derided in favour of a masculine hierarchy or patriarchical system; quite the reverse, rather Feminism fails because it replaces the essence of feminity – crucial to the eruption of truth – with a masculine essentialism that is malignatly reductive. So this raises the question: If feminism is of this sort, as both Nietzsche and Derrida outline here, is feminism philosophically desireable?

Has the time come for a philosophical re-evaluation of the feminine?

Engraved in the tomb of Karl Marx is an inscription that reads, “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” The question I would like to ask today is whether or not an investigation into philosophical failure or error is necessary. What do I have in mind? Well, even though Marx crafted a philosophy that evaluates and exposes capitalism for the grave injustice of de-humanization; I think we can also credit Marx with the creation of a mode of discursivity that ultimately fueled one of the greatest totalitarian and dehumanizing societies in recent history – the USSR. In a very tragic sense, Marxist philosophy failed in the Eastern block, tens of thousands were killed in the gulag, and millions of lives were destroyed. It would be unfair and unjust to credit those atrocities to Karl Marx, but we can at least say that his philosophy (if we consider it as an attempt to change the world for the better – which is what Marx had hoped for) failed to some extent.

Additionally we might consider other sorts of philosophical failure, such as the epistemological problems indicative of Aristotelian physics. Aristotle for much of his genius held many views, including the notion that the earth is at the center of the heavens, that today we realize are just plain false. Frege’s symbolic logic was wrong, Wittgenstein’s atomic proposition theory failed, Descartes’ ontological proof collapses, and so on and so on. When scholars teach the history of philosophy they always focus on those arguments, views, and positions which are still tenable, as it were. But the actual history of philosophy reads like the tell tale heart: buried beneath the floorboards of “respectable philosophy” are the ghosts and apparitions of failed ideas.

So when do philosophies fail? Why do they fail? And how can social philosophies avoid error?

Perhaps the time has come for a philosophy of failure.

In a rather thought-provoking article by John Cassidy of the New Yorker entitled Rational Irrationality, the question of whether or not reason can culminate into irrationality is raised. I think this is a very important question, and its also a disturbing question for the philosopher. Philosophers tend to believe that reason is something of a good, that when we live rationally we will live better lives. But when Cassidy reviews the buildup to the economic collapse, his analysis shows that quite rational behavior on a micro scale can lead to irrational behavior at the macro level. So what went wrong with the economic crisis? – was it namely a situation in which very rational people, making rational decisions, created an utterly irrational mess or was it that those people were simply reckless and irrational to begin with? The easy,and I think reckless, sort of answer to this question is to affirm the latter possibility and deny the former. The difficult task is to come to grips with this notion of rational irrationality; and this is the task for the philosophical inquirer.

There are of course a number of reasons for the culmination of the economic crisis that has cost so many so much – from the types of derivatives sold, to periodic rollback of economic regulatory mechanisms over the past thirty years, to the compensation practices of investment corporations, and a thousand other important factors that went unnoticed – but none of these are reasons to explain how irrationality arises from rationality. In order to better grasp the problem, lets think about the problem of the commons.

In his pivotal essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin discovers the problem of rational irrationality. In short order, Hardin states that when the benefits of an action are individualized and the risk is generalized, such that everyone shares the loss, social groups lock themselves into a tragedy of ruin. For example, imagine a hypothetical community in Texas, let’s say, that is allotted a certain amount of water to be used per month. Yet when the community uses more water than allotted, the extra cost of each 100 gallons ($1) is divided evenly between each of the communities’ 1000 residents; the city leaders believe this will be an equitable way for everyone to share the burden of the water shortage. Yet in this community there are three businesses which make ice tea, coffee, and lemonade respectively. When the water alarm goes off signaling that the community has used their monthly allowance of water, each of the business owners must decide if using more is worth the price that the entire community must pay. What will they decide? For every 100 gallons that they use they will receive 100% of the profits gained, while they will only be forced to pay .1% of the total tax incurred by their own activity. It is clear – the most rational thing to do for the business owners is to keep making their drinks and let everyone else pay for the damage. And if we multiplied this situation throughout all of the communities in Texas, the water source would surely run dry and everyone is ruined. Here a purely rational choice leads to utterly irrational and damning consequence. Is reason to blame?

Yes and no. The tragedy of the commons depends upon the division of reasons between an individual and a whole society (the micro and macro levels). When these divisions in the reasons for action are not balanced with each other, ruin is the consequence. Another term for an unhinged reason for action that takes no other reasons into consideration is ideology. An ideology consists of a set of reasons for action that always dominate other reasons for action, such that the micro reason (profit in this case) subordinates the macro reason (conserve water). This definition of ideology is not mine. Philosopher Hannah Arendt writes, “An ideology is quite literally what its name indicates: it is the logic of an idea… The ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the same “law” as the logical exposition of its ‘idea’. Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process – the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future – because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas.” (from The Origins of Totalitarianism, p604) In the case of our economic crisis, when profit always superordinates other reasons for individual action we end up with an ideology that quite obviously acts to destroy itself. The characters of the crisis, the bankers, the fed, the congress, etc. acted rationally; but the problem was that they acted only with the idea of profit in their minds – for either making profit or speeding it along the way. They become blind ideologues who like superstitious creatures from another age, believed that hidden mystery behind life was as simple as an economic principle. The rational becomes irrational when it becomes ideological. Reason is no guard from itself.

Many students ask the question: what is philosophy?  Against the typical back drop of the cool, dry, and often boring generalization that philosophy is a useless subject without direct influence on our lives and the world, I answer that philosophy is first and foremost for the living.  What do I mean by this?  Philosophy is not so much a subject matter to be studied by scholars; but rather, it is a certain way of living that unites contemplation with action that can be adopted by all.  The task of the philosopher is the interrogation of our world and the reasons we have for being the types of people we are and making the sorts of decissions that we do.  The truth is that many (or even most) people live their lives according to a routine mechanized way of thinking.  Philosophy attempts to crack the wall of solidified reasoning and allow for a fluid, lively, and enlightening investigation of how we ought to live.  In many ways, philosophy is also a damnation to those who arrogantly pronounce that they have knowledge and need not question their views.  The fuel of philosophy is the ability to ask questions and the courage of philosophy consists in the ability to admit one’s ignorance.  It is against the matrix of cultural assumptions and the variety of ignorances that philosophy can be seen as a threat.  Many people often think that philosophy can be dangerous, especially for those who hold particular religous views – but philosophy is only a danger for those whose views are accepted out of habit and not contemplation.  Philosophy promises nothing other than the realization that a life without contemplation is a life of vanity, foolishness, and ultimately a life without value.

This blog will explore the variety of ways in which philosophy can and does make an impact on both knowledge and action.  In the coming weeks and months, I encourage you to follow me in the discussion over the relevance of philosophy in the contemporary world by adding your comments and questions to the discussion.  I look forward to this forum and the e-space for philosophical discussion.